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VERIDICAL VERDICTS: INCREASING VERDICT
ACCURACY THROUGH THE USE OF
OVERTLY PROBABILISTIC EVIDENCE
AND METHODS
JonathanJ. Koehlert
Daniel N. Shaviro tt
For nearly twenty years, law journals have been the forum for a
bitter debate about the use at trial of overtly probabilistic evidence
and methods.' The debate embraces (and often confuses) at least
three issues.
The first issue is the appropriateness of allowing juries to base
factual determinations, in whole or in part, on probabilities derived
from base rate evidence.2 While some commentators generally sup-
port the use of base rate evidence at trial,3 others argue that it is
t JonathanJ. Koehler (M.A. 1985, Ph.D. 1989, University of Chicago, Department
of Behavioral Sciences) is a Postdoctoral Scholar in Psychology & Law at Stanford Uni-
versity and a Visiting Scholar at Stanford Law School.
tt Daniel N. Shaviro (J.D. 1981, Yale Law School) is an Assistant Professor of Law
at the University of Chicago Law School.
The authors are grateful to Brian Gibbs, David Kaye, and Joshua Klayman for help-
ful comments on an earlier draft.
1 See, e.g., L.JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) [hereinaf-
ter LJ. COHEN I]; V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961); Lea Brilmayer, Second Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66
B.U.L. REV. 673 (1986); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods
and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter "Brook I"];James Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence ofldntification in Civil Litigation:
Well-Worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293 (1985) [herein-
after "Brook II"]; L. Jonathan Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gate-
crasher, 1981 ARiz. ST. LJ. 627 [hereinafter "LJ. Cohen II"]; Michael Finkelstein &
William Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1970);
John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact-Finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968);
David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34 (1979);
Charles Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inference: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1187 (1979) [hereinafter "Nesson I"]; Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?
On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) [hereinafter
"Nesson IrF]; Michael Saks & Robert Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980); and Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathe-
matics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
2 Base rates describe the frequency with which a relevant attribute occurs among
members of a reference population. A base rate may also be thought of as the
probability that a randomly selected member of a reference population will have the
relevant attribute.
3 See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 1; Kaye, supra note 1.
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irrelevant absent a causal link to the specific case before the jury;4
yet others contend that it may be relevant but is insufficient to sup-
port a verdict. 5
The second issue concerns the use of subjective probabilities,
or personal estimates of the probability that a factual proposition is
true. Commentators dispute the feasibility and appropriateness of
encouraging such estimates and employing probability theory to as-
sess the combined significance of several subjective estimates that
pertain to the same case. 6
The third issue, which embraces the first two, is the underlying
purposes trials should serve. It is widely agreed that an important
objective of trials is verdict accuracy, or attempting to impose guilt
or liability when, but only when, the actual facts warrant it.7 Yet
trials may serve other objectives as well, thus inevitably complicat-
ing the choice of appropriate rules and procedures.
One cannot determine the merits of using base rate evidence
and subjective probabilities without stipulating the underlying pur-
poses in structuring trials. Yet commentators have not always dis-
tinguished clearly between verdict accuracy and what we will term
"policy concerns" (i.e., policies distinct from verdict accuracy that
are implicated by trials)." Instead, they often have let their views
about one dictate their views about the other. Since the two are
conceptually distinct, however, it is useful to consider separately the
implications of probabilistic evidence for each in order to identify
and evaluate the tradeoffs that may be involved.
This Article will perform the first half of the necessary analysis
by examining the effect of overtly probabilistic evidence and meth-
ods on verdict accuracy. We will show that overtly probabilistic evi-
dence is no less probative of legally material facts than other types
of evidence. We will suggest, moreover, that rules of probability
theory such as Bayes' theorem can improve the accuracy with which
juries evaluate evidence in particular cases, even when applied
(where feasible) to subjective probabilities.
Our analysis will not reach the question of whether, on balance,
greater use of overtly probabilistic evidence and methods at trial is
desirable. This determination depends on the value attached to
specific policy concerns other than verdict accuracy. We hope to
show, however, that a refusal to employ overtly probabilistic evi-
4 See, e.g., LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1; LJ. Cohen II, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., Nesson I, supra note 1; Nesson II, supra note 1; Tribe, supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1; LJ.
Cohen II, supra note 1; Tribe, supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., Saks & Kidd, supra note 1; Tribe, supra note 1.
8 While using the term "policy concerns" in this fashion for convenience, we rec-
ognize that verdict accuracy is a policy like any other.
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dence and methods has a cost, namely, increasing the probability of
inaccurate verdicts. At times, this cost may be worth incurring if the
expected benefits are sufficient; but it should not be denied or
ignored. 9
Section I of this Article discusses the basic terms involved in a
consideration of overtly probabilistic evidence. Section II considers
the significance for verdict accuracy of using base rate evidence.
Section III discusses the use of subjective probabilities. Section IV
discusses problems with the use at trial of probabilistic evidence and
methods. Section V provides a summary and conclusion.
I
DIsCUSSION OF TERMS
This section discusses the basic terms that govern our consider-
ation of overtly probabilistic evidence. It begins by defining verdict
accuracy and distinguishing that goal from other policy concerns of
the trial process. It then defines overtly probabilistic evidence, in-
cluding base rates and subjective probabilities. Finally, it describes
certain basic rules of probability theory, such as the product rule
and Bayes' theorem.
A. Objectives of the Trial Process
1. Verdict Accuracy
At many trials, both civil and criminal, one of the parties is fac-
tually in the right. A defendant either was or was not correctly iden-
tified as the murderer; a plaintiff either did or did not make
statements expressing oral agreement to a contract. In such cases, if
all the relevant facts became known after trial, it would be possible
to decide whether or not the verdict was factually accurate.
Of course, some cases are more ambiguous. Was the defendant
in a murder trial legally insane? Did a tobacco company that is sued
by a smoker's estate act reasonably in light of the information it pos-
sessed about the medical effects of smoking? Even in these cases,
however, subsidiary questions of disputed fact may have correct an-
swers. In such cases, if one knows the details of the fact-finder's
reasoning, one can speak of the factual accuracy of its judgments
with respect to these questions.
9 We also will not attempt to quantify this cost or to determine when the expected
benefits of overtly probabilistic evidence and methods are sufficiently high to mandate
their use. Yet it is worth noting that scientific advances may cause the usefulness of such
evidence and methods to increase over time. For example, improved methods for test-
ing blood, hair, and skin samples found at the scene of a crime may increase the availa-
bility of statistical evidence regarding the percentage of the population that, like the
defendant, would be possible sources of such samples.
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To the extent that the facts of a case, if known to the fact-finder,
would require a particular verdict in light of the applicable law, one
can speak of verdict accuracy. In practice, the criteria for measuring
verdict accuracy generally do not exist; one often cannot be certain
about all of the relevant disputed facts. Yet the lack of a truth crite-
rion does not mean that verdicts are neither accurate nor inaccurate;
it merely indicates limits to our knowledge about particular cases.
Verdict accuracy is one of the principal goals of the trial pro-
cess. 10 Even in the absence of separate policy concerns that influ-
ence the conduct of trials, however, accuracy cannot be guaranteed.
Gaps and mistakes in fact-finding inevitably will occur in some cases
and thus lead to inaccurate verdicts. Given this problem, along with
the lack of a truth criterion even after trial, the best that can be ac-
complished in relation to verdict accuracy is to minimize the number
of inaccurate verdicts that one reasonably expects.
A fact-finder who was motivated solely by verdict accuracy
would always hold in favor of whichever party appeared more likely
to be correct in light of the evidence. Assuming a positive correla-
tion between the fact-finder's belief and the true state of affairs, such
a verdict would minimize the likelihood of individual case error, and
thus promote verdict accuracy in general. This objective might sug-
gest following an overtly probabilistic methodology: for example,
attempting to determine mathematically, based on one's views
about particular issues, whether one believes that the likelihood of
the plaintiff's being entitled to recover is greater than fifty percent.
2. Policy Concerns Apart From Verdict Accuracy
Verdict accuracy is not and should not be the only objective
served by trials. If it were, one might decry not only all testimonial
privileges but even the legal system's refusal to countenance the use
of interrogation tools such as torture and sodium pentothal."1
However, since verdict accuracy is the goal that we isolate for analy-
sis in this Article, it is useful to distinguish certain other policy con-
cerns that we are expressly disregarding.
Many policy concerns relate to the trial (or pretrial) process,
rather than to the verdict reached in a particular case. For example,
consider the fourth amendment ban on certain searches and
seizures, or the wide array of testimonial privileges that can be as-
serted to resist disclosure of confidential communications. Such
rules exclude probative evidence, and thus presumably reduce ver-
dict accuracy. They do so to protect certain individual rights or pro-
10 "The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth .... Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
11 See Kaye, supra note 1, at 45 n.41.
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mote particular business or personal relationships. In practice,
some of these rules may promote particular outcomes (e.g., acquittal
of criminal defendants in the case of the fourth amendment). Yet
this is in a sense incidental; the rules are based on concern about
means rather than ends.
Other policy concerns relate directly to the verdict reached by
the fact-finder. For example, consider the requirement that criminal
guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This requirement re-
flects the view that an erroneous conviction is far more regrettable
than an erroneous acquittal. 12
Another possible policy concern that relates directly to verdicts
involves the fact-finder's confidence about the probability that par-
ticular facts are true. Consider, for example, two civil trials in which
the jury believes that there is a sixty percent chance that the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover if all of the facts were accurately known.
In the first case, the jury has heard extensive evidence and believes
it has a very strong grasp of the issues. It therefore believes that
additional evidence would be unlikely to change its assessment
significantly.
In the second case, however, the jury has heard only scant evi-
dence and has little confidence in its assessment of the probabilities.
It already has drawn all reasonable inferences from the evidence
(and lack thereof) in determining that the plaintiff is sixty percent
likely to be entitled to recover. Yet it is concerned that additional
evidence, if made available, might significantly shift its view of the
probabilities.
The jury in the second case is experiencing uncertainty about
its uncertainty, or second-order uncertainty.' 3 It is subject, not only
to the first-order uncertainty implicit in the sixty percent
probability, but also to uncertainty about this very estimate. The
jury views its estimate as unresilient. As far as it knows, only a small
amount of additional information might substantially change its esti-
mate of the probability that the plaintiff is correct.
Empirical studies suggest that people making judgments and
decisions generally take both first-order and second-order uncer-
tainty into account. 14 For example, people engaged in gambling
12 The reasonable doubt requirement also reflects policy concerns, such as making
less visible, obvious, or seemingly intentional the occasional conviction of an innocent
defendant. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Statistical Probability Evidence and the Appearance ofJustice,
103 HARV. L. REV. 530 (1989).
13 See Hillel Einhorn & Robin Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Infer-
ence, 92 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 433 (1985).
14 See id.; see also Selwyn Becker & Fred Brownson, What Price Ambiguity? Or the Role
of Ambiguity in Decision Making, 72 J. POL. ECON. 62 (1964); Frank Yates & Lisa Zukowski,
Characterization of Ambiguity in Decision Making, 21 BEHAV. SCI. 19 (1976).
1990] 251
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
will often sacrifice expected payoff value in return for decreases in
second-order uncertainty. 15 Some commentators have suggested
that second-order uncertainty about one's estimate of the
probability of guilt or liability suggests declining to allow a verdict
for the prosecutor or plaintiff, even if this estimate exceeds an
otherwise appropriate threshold (e.g., 50.1 percent in a civil case).16
If these commentators are correct, it should be clear that they
are voicing policy concerns apart from verdict accuracy. Just as it
would be irrational to be influenced by second-order uncertainty if
one's sole objective as a bettor is to maximize expected profit, 17 so it
is a mistake to believe that verdict accuracy can be enhanced by sec-
ond-order considerations.
B. Overtly Probabilistic Evidence
All evidence is probabilistic, in the sense that there is a risk of
error in relying on it to support a factual conclusion about a case. 18
Overtly probabilistic evidence, however, makes the risk of error
explicit.
1. Base Rates
Perhaps the most common type of overtly probabilistic evi-
dence involves base rates. A base rate may be defined as the relative
frequency with which an event occurs or an attribute is present in a
population. The base rate for an event or attribute equals the
probability that it will be present in any randomly selected member
of the reference class prior to the introduction of case-specific or
individuating information.
As an example of a base rate, consider a hypothetical developed
by Professor Nesson in which there are twenty-five prisoners in an
enclosed yard, twenty-four of whom collaborate in the murder of a
prison guard. The twenty-fifth prisoner hides in a nearby shed dur-
ing the crime and is innocent of all involvement. Prior to the intro-
duction of any evidence about which of the twenty-five prisoners did
or did not participate in the murder, the probability that a randomly
15 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 QJ. EcON. 643 (1961).
16 See, e.g., LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1; Brilmayer, supra note 1; L.J. Cohen II, supra
note 1.
17 Bettors may be rationally deterred by second-order uncertainty if they have bet-
ting objectives other than profit maximization. For example, one may dislike feeling
foolish if one not only loses a bet but discovers that additional information would have
changed one's estimates sharply. Or one may prefer betting on certain sixty percent
probabilities, rather than on uncertain sixty percent probabilities, due to an aversion to
increasing variance in long run success rates. See Bruno De Finetti, Probabilities of
Probabilities: A Real Problem or a Misunderstanding?, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN THE APPLICA-
TIONS OF BAYESIAN METHODS (Ahmet Aykac & Carlo Brumat eds. 1977).
Is Tribe, supra note 1, at 1330 n.2.
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selected prisoner is guilty is 24/25, or ninety-six percent.' 9
In some instances (such as the prisoner case), a base rate fre-
quency may express the probability of ultimate guilt or liability. In
practice, however, this is extremely rare. The fact to which a base
rate relates may be only one of several at issue in a case. One exam-
ple is a case in which the base rate helps determine who committed
an act, but liability also requires a finding of negligence. Moreover,
there may be evidence apart from the base rate that relates to the
same fact (e.g., conflicting eyewitness testimony about identity).
Thus, base rate evidence often must be combined with other evi-
dence and inferences before a probabilistic conclusion can be
reached.
2. Subjective Probabilities
Another type of overtly probabilistic estimate arises when one
makes a personalistic or subjective assessment of the probability
that a particular claim is true. For example, in the prisoner hypo-
thetical, following the introduction of additional evidence a juror
might believe that there is a seventy-five percent chance that the de-
fendant participated in the murder.
One could try to describe the juror's belief as suggesting that, if
a case with identical evidence took place one hundred times, then
the juror would expect that in seventy-five cases the defendant actu-
ally participated in the murder. The problem with so expressing the
personal probability estimate, however, is that the set of evidence in
this case may be unique. The prisoner either is or is not actually
guilty, and the set of evidence cannot be tested one hundred times.
Accordingly, in conventional discourse, the juror's estimate de-
scribes only a state of mind or degree of belief. Operationally
speaking, a seventy-five percent subjective estimate of guilt means
that the juror would be as willing to wager on guilt as to wager (for
example) that a card randomly selected from a well-shuffled deck
would be a spade, club, or diamond, rather than a heart.20
C. Probabilistic Methodologies
The rules of mathematics often provide means of assessing the
combined significance of more than one probability estimate. For
example, if the likelihood of Facts X, Y, and Z all are known, and
enough is known about how the truth of each fact affects the truth of
19 See Nesson I, supra note 1, at 1192-93.
20 See LEONARD J. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954); Tribe, supra note 1,
at 1346-49. The juror is assumed for this purpose to be a profit-maximizer who is un-
deterred by second-order uncertainty.
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the others, then one can calculate the likelihood that any combina-
tion of the three is true.
It is widely recognized that base rates and subjective probabili-
ties obey the same mathematical rules.21 Thus, the rules can be
used to assess the combined significance of subjective probabilities,
yielding revised probabilities that are internally consistent.
1. The Product Rule
One application of mathematics to multiple probabilities is the
product rule, which states that the probability of the joint occur-
rence of Events A and B is (1) the probability of Event A, times (2)
the probability of Event B given the occurrence of Event A. 22 When
the events in question are independent, 23 the probability of their
joint occurrence is simply the product of their individual probabili-
ties. 24 For example, if the chance of any coin toss yielding heads is
1/2, then the chance that any two coin tosses will both be heads is
1/2 X 1/2, or 1/4.
Two events may also be completely dependent. Thus, assume
that Events A and B each have a 1/2 chance of occurring, but that
Event B occurs if and only if Event A occurs. In such a case, the
chance that both A and B will occur is equal to the chance of either
occurring, or 1/2.25
In some cases, events may be less completely dependent. The
occurrence of Event A may make Event B more (or less) likely, yet it
may be possible for either event to occur when the other does not.
In such cases of partial dependence, the probability that two events
both will occur is somewhere between the lower bound established
by the independence form of the product rule and the higher bound
that follows from complete dependence. Thus, in the last example
above, partial dependence would suggest that the chance of Events
A and B both occurring is somewhere between 1/4 and 1/2.26
21 The point was originally made by Savage. See Kaye, supra note 1, at 44 n.35.
22 See, e.g., RICHARD A. WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS IN LITIGATION 39 (1985); Allison
Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective
Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 538, 541-42 (1969).
23 See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968)
(prejudicial error committed by trial court in admitting expert testimony on the joint
probability of a series of events without first establishing the independence of those
events).
24 Two Events, A and B, are independent if the probability of A equals the
probability ofA given that B has occurred, and the probability of B equals the probability
of B given that A has occurred (i.e., P(A) = P(A/B) and P(B) = P(B/A)).
25 Formally, if P(A) = 1/2, P(B) = 1/2, P(A/B) 1 , and P(B/A) = 1, then
P(A and B) = P(A/B) X P(B) = P(B/A) X P(A) = 1 X 1/2 = 1/2.
26 In light of the attack on probabilistic methods in Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319,438 P.2d
33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, the difference between the independence form of the product rule
and the general rule is worth emphasizing. In Collins, a series of estimated probabilities
[Vol. 75:247254
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2. Bayes' Theorem
Bayes' theorem is a method for combining unconditional and
conditional probabilities in the face of new evidence to derive re-
vised estimates of the probability that a particular claim is true.2 7,
To illustrate Bayes' theorem, consider the following problem posed
by Tversky and Kahneman:
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab
companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are
given the following data: (i) 85%o of the cabs in the city are Green
and 15% are Blue. (ii) A witness identified the cab as a Blue Cab.
The court tested his ability to identify cabs under the appropriate
visibility conditions. When presented with a sample of cabs (half
of which were Blue and half of which were Green) the witness
made correct identifications in 80%o of the cases and erred in 20%o
of the cases. Question: What is the probability that the cab in-
were multiplied to determine the probability of their joint occurrence, based on the
unsupported assumption that all of the probabilities were independent. Thus, as indi-
cated by the California Supreme Court and numerous subsequent commentators, the
product rule was misused in Collins. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE
METHODS IN LAw (1978); William Fairley & Frederick Moesteller, A Conversation About
Collins, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 242 (1974); Tribe, supra note 1. The validity of the product
rule itself generally is not disputed, although L.J. COHEN I, supra note 1, at 32, provides
an alternative probability calculus.
27 Bayes' theorem follows directly from the product rule discussed earlier, which
holds that the joint probability of two events, H and E, equals the product of the condi-
tional probability of one of the events given the second event, and the probability of the
second event. In mathematical notation:
P(H & E) = P(H/E) P(E)
P(H & E) = P(E/H) P(H)
Equating the two right sides of the equations gives:
P(E/H) P(H)
P(H/E) --
P(E)
where P(E) = P(E/H) P(H) + P(E/-H) P(-H) for binary hypotheses.
Bayes' theorem may also be expressed in odds form as follows:
P(E/H) P(H)
P(H/E) P(E) P(E/H) P(H) P(H) P(E/H)
-X x
P(-H/E) P(E/-H) P(-H) P(E/-H) P(-H) P(-H) P(E/-H)
P(E)
The letters H and E may be thought of as standing for Hypothesis and Evidence
respectively. P(H) and P(-H) refer to the likelihoods of the truth and falsity of hypothe-
sis H prior to the collection of additional evidence. In Bayesian terminology, P(H) and
P(-H) are "priors" and their ratio is the "prior odds." P(E/H) and P(E/-H) represent
the information value of the evidence if H is true and if H is false respectively; their ratio
is the "likelihood ratio." P(H/E) and P(-H/E) are the likelihoods that the hypothesis is
true and false in light of the evidence; their ratio is the "posterior odds," which repre-
sents the combination of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio.
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volved in the accident was Blue rather than Green?28
The answer to the question (assuming no other evidence)
under Bayes' theorem may be grasped intuitively by considering
what would happen in one hundred cases where the above problem
arose, assuming a distribution of events in accord with the probabili-
ties provided. First, based on the percentages given in (i), in eighty-
five cases the cab would be Green. Given the witness's eighty per-
cent accuracy rate, in sixty-eight of these cases he would correctly
state that the cab was Green, and in seventeen cases he would incor-
rectly state that the cab was Blue. Second, in fifteen cases the cab
would be Blue. Given the witness's accuracy, in twelve of these
cases he would correctly state that the cab was Blue, and in three
cases he would incorrectly state that it was Green.
In the present case, however, the witness stated that the cab was
Blue. Accordingly, the two relevant frequencies above are the
twelve cases in which he said it was Blue when it indeed was Blue,
and the seventeen cases in which he said it was Blue when it actually
was Green. Thus, the probability that the cab in fact was Blue, given
that the witness said it was Blue, is only 12/29, or about forty-one
percent.
As Kahneman and Tversky demonstrate, this answer is some-
what counter-intuitive. People tend to focus disproportionately on
the witness's eighty percent accuracy rate, and to undervalue (or al-
together ignore) the base rate information concerning the frequency
of the two types of cabs. 29 They do not seem to appreciate that,
because the witness is much more likely to have encountered a
Green cab than a Blue cab, he would have more opportunities to err
about the former than to perceive the latter accurately.
By combining prior probabilities and likelihood values to deter-
mine posterior probabilities, Bayes' theorem provides a strategy for
updating one's probability estimates as more information becomes
available. Of course, the theorem has nothing to say about the ve-
racity or reliability of the input probabilities. A posterior
probability value is no more valid than the inputs that contribute to
its computation. Yet Bayes' theorem does ensure a posterior value
that is consistent with a decisionmaker's other probabilistic
estimates.
28 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schellas in Judgments Under Uncertainty,
in PROGRESS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Martin Fishbein ed. 1980).
29 Since Tversky and Kahneman introduced the cab problem in 1972, numerous
studies have indicated that people apparently pay relatively little attention to the experi-
menter-supplied base rate information. See Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base Rate Fallacy Contro-
versy, in DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (R. Scholtz ed. 1983).
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VERDICT ACcuRACY AND THE USE OF BASE RATE
EVIDENCE
Debate about base rate evidence has largely been dominated by
hypotheticals, or perhaps by a single hypothetical that appears in
several different guises. One form of the hypothetical is Professor
Nesson's prisoner case, in which twenty-four out of twenty-five pris-
oners participated in the murder of a prison guard. Nesson de-
scribes the ninety-six percent probability that a randomly selected
prisoner participated in the murder as "purely statistical" evi-
dence.30 He argues that the case would not and should not be al-
lowed to go to the jury absent case-specific evidence pertaining to
the particular defendant on trial. 31
Two related hypotheticals that concern civil rather than crimi-
nal liability have also been widely discussed in the literature. First,
in the blue bus case described by Professor Tribe, a plaintiff is hit by
a bus that she believes was blue, but otherwise cannot describe. She
offers no evidence that the defendant bus company was liable, be-
yond establishing that it operates eighty percent of the blue buses in
town. She is not allowed to recover.3 2
Second, in British philosopher LJ. Cohen's "gatecrasher para-
dox," 1000 people whose identities are known attend a rodeo to
which the promoter sold only 499 tickets. Thus, it appears that 501
attendees, or slightly more than half, entered without paying, but
they cannot be identified except as members of the larger group.
Here too the base rate evidence, suggesting a 50.1 percent
probability that a particular rodeo attendee was a gatecrasher, is de-
scribed as purely statistical, and thus as insufficient to support a
verdict. 33
The prisoner, blue bus, and gatecrasher hypotheticals share two
critical characteristics. First, they provide a base rate for guilt or
liability, not simply f6r a factual characteristic distinct from the ulti-
mate legal issue. Second, they provide no evidence other than a
base rate (except insofar as inferences can be drawn from the par-
ties' litigating position or their failure to introduce more
evidence) .34
30 Nesson I supra note 1, at 1193.
31 Id.
32 Tribe, supra note 1, at 1340-41 (loosely based on the real case of Smith v. Rapid
Transit, Inc. 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945)).
33 LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1, at 75.
34 See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imper-
fect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985) [hereinafter "N. Cohen I"]; Kaye, supra
note 1.
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These characteristics are highly unusual; indeed, so much so
that it is far from clear that existing law requires the suggested ver-
dicts.35 By being so unusual, the hypotheticals divert attention from
issues more commonly posed by the use of base rate evidence-is-
sues such as the need to combine such evidence with additional,
more subjective evidence, or to choose among different base rates.
Perhaps the hypotheticals' main advantage is that they drama-
tize the anti-Bayesian position: that base rate evidence is insufficient
to support a verdict, and that this insufficiency results from its sup-
posed inferiority to evidence that is considered specific to the case at
hand.36 This Section examines these premises from the standpoint
of verdict accuracy, considering why and when base rate evidence is
relevant, as well as whether it is less probative than case-specific evi-
dence. It then considers the use of probabilistic methodologies with
respect to base rate evidence.
A. The Relevance of Base Rate Evidence
1. Why Base Rates Are Relevant
Base rate evidence is relevant because it can assist one in assess-
ing whether a particular fact is true. Consider again the prisoner
hypothetical. The base rate of ninety-six percent does not, of
course, establish with certainty whether any particular defendant is
guilty. However, it provides the long run accuracy rate that would
result from repeatedly holding for the prosecution (assuming ran-
dom selection of prisoner defendants from among the group). The
conviction of all twenty-five prisoners would lead to twenty-four ac-
curate verdicts and one inaccurate verdict.
It may be objected that long run verdict accuracy is not the
proper goal in any particular case. Instead one should seek to de-
cide that case accurately. 37 Some have based this view on policy con-
cerns apart from verdict accuracy, such as an asserted ethical need
to treat people as individuals rather than as sample members of
larger reference classes. 38
From the standpoint of verdict accuracy, however, the distinc-
35 See Brook II, supra note 1, at 294, 299-310; D.H. Kaye, The Admissibility of
"Probability Evidence" in Criminal Trials Part II, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 160 (1987); D.H. Kaye,
The Admissibility of "Probability Evidence" in Criminal Trials Part 1, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 343,
343-46 (1986).
36 See, e.g., Brilmayer,supra note 1, at 675-76; Nesson II,supra note 1, at 1357, 1379.
37 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 150.
38 See, e.g., id. at 150 n. 119; Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predict-
ing Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
Yet, one might wonder whether a person who lost an important legal case because of the
exclusion of base rate evidence would derive much solace from being treated as a unique
human being.
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tion between the long run and the particular case is invalid. Since
the long run is composed of a series of individual cases, information
(such as base rates) that informs long-run accuracy rates must like-
wise inform the likelihood of accuracy in individual cases.
In an example like the prisoner hypothetical, where there is no
evidence differentiating the members of the reference class from
which the base rate is derived, all members share the same
probability of possessing the measured attribute (i.e., ninety-six per-
cent). Only when differentiating evidence becomes available does it
make sense to regard an individual member's probability as any-
thing other than the base rate frequency for the general reference
class to which he belongs.
Even given information differentiating the members of a refer-
ence class, base rate evidence remains relevant to specific cases. For
example, in the prisoner hypothetical, assume that a particular de-
fendant has an unusually peaceful disposition. This fact may sug-
gest that the ninety-six percent base rate overstates the probability
of his guilt. Yet the character evidence does not make this base rate
evidence irrelevant. One's posterior probability estimate should
and likely would be very different than if, say, only one of the
twenty-five prisoners was guilty.
2. Assessing the Relevance of Particular Base Rates
a. Base Rate Specificity
Even if the relevance of base rates in general is assumed, there
is some question as to which base rates should be used in particular
cases. This problem tends to be disguised by hypotheticals such as
the gatecrasher and prisoner cases. In such cases, even if one is re-
luctant to ground a verdict on the base rates alone, it seems clear
that the base rates were derived from appropriate reference classes
(i.e., the number of rodeo attendees or prisoners in the yard).
In Kahneman and Tversky's cab problem, 39 however, one may
question the appropriateness of the reference class (i.e., cabs in the
city where the accident occurred). This reference class is relatively
unspecific; it reflects fewer seemingly important features of the case
at hand than would the reference class "cabs in the city that were
involved in accidents," or "cabs in the city that were involved in
accidents at night."
As noted earlier, research shows that people ignore or attach
little weight to the citywide base rate in assessing the probabilities in
the cab problem, apparently considering it insufficiently informative
by reason of its unspecificity. When the reference class is narrowed
39 See supra text accompanying note 28.
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from cabs in the city to cab accidents in the city, they accord it more
weight, although still less than that suggested by Bayes' theorem.40
LJ. Cohen argues that people are correct to ignore frequencies
as unspecific as the citywide base rate for cabs:
[W]hy on earth should it be supposed that subjects, asked to esti-
mate the unconditional probability that the cab involved in the acci-
dent was [B]lue, ought to take into account a prior distribution of
colours that would at best be relevant only if the issue at stake was
just about the colour of a cab that was said to have been seen
somewhere, not necessarily in an accident, and was taken to be
[B]lue? 4 1
Cohen concludes that the citywide cab distribution of eighty-five
percent Green and fifteen percent Blue provides a "very weak foun-
dation for an estimate of the relevant base rate."'42
Yet what is meant by the relevant base rate (or the relevant refer-
ence class)?43 The phrases imply exclusivity. However, while "cabs
in accidents in the city" is a more informative reference class than
"cabs in the city"-since it takes into account an additional factor of
potentially great significance (namely, the propensity of different
cab companies to get into accidents)-it is not even the most in-
formative reference class. For example, "cabs in accidents in the
city at night'" would take into account an additional factor of poten-
tial importance. If location within the city is important, a still better
reference class might be "cabs in accidents at night in the same gen-
eral area"-or perhaps even "cabs in accidents at night at exactly
the same location." 44
It would seem, then, that there is no such thing as the relevant
base rate. Some base rates are better than others in that they are
derived from reference classes that take into account more poten-
tially important information from the particular case.45 An increase
40 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 28, at 157-58.
41 L. Jonathan Cohen, Are There Any A Priori Constraints on the Study of Rationality?, 4
BEHAV. & BRAIN Sc. 359, 365 (1981) (emphasis in original).
42 Id. (emphasis in original).
43 See LJ. Cohen II, supra note 1, at 633. (LJ. Cohen discusses the "suitably nar-
rowed down reference class" that should be used to decide a case).
44 As the reference class is increasingly refined, however, the sample space from
which the base rate is computed becomes smaller. This may be problematic because
base rates derived from small sample spaces are less reliable than those derived from
larger sample spaces. See infra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Kevin Lanning,
Some Reasons for Distinguishing Between "Non-normative Response" and "Irrational Decision",
121 J. PSYCHOLOGY 109, 112 (1987) (discussion of the "trade-off between fineness of
analysis and statistical power" when choosing reference classes).
45 The priority between base rates that reflect different information is not always
clear. Thus, in the cab problem, people might disagree about whether a base rate for
cabs in accidents in the city, or for cabs operating at night, is more informative. Where
this is the case, presumably both base rates should be admitted, and the jury allowed to
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in base rate specificity generally reduces second-order uncertainty,
since it reduces the amount of unknown information that might
change one's estimate. Yet a base rate need not meet any particular
standard of specificity in order to be relevant.
From the perspective of verdict accuracy, it is unjustifiable to
ignore, by reason of its ufispecificity, the best available base rate.
For example, to ignore the citywide base rate for Blue and Green
cabs, when no better base rate is available, is tantamount to assum-
ing that the likelihood of Blue and Green cabs being involved in an
accident is the same (i.e., fifty percent for each).46 However, the ci-
tywide base rate provides some evidence that this is not the case.
Since eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are Green, one's best
guess-in the absence of any information to suggest otherwise 47-is
that eighty-five percent of the cabs in accidents are Green. Likewise,
one's best guess is that eighty-five percent of the cab accidents at
night involve Green cabs, and so on for further refinements of the
cab base rate.
In conclusion, (1) in many cases, no particular base rate or ref-
erence class is uniquely relevant, (2) base rates derived from rela-
tively unspecific reference classes may be associated with greater
second-order uncertainty, and (3) in the absence of grounds for
modifying a computed frequency, a base rate's specificity should
have no effect on its evidentiary weight from the standpoint of ver-
dict accuracy.
b. Base Rate Sampling Problems
A base rate can reflect an examination of either all members of
a reference class or a sample of members. When based on a sample,
its use requires the inference that the sample base rate accurately
represents that for the entire reference class.
The use of non-random or small samples generally promotes
second-order uncertainty by creating or increasing doubt that the
assess their comparative relevance. However, when it is clear that one base rate is more
specific than another, in that it incorporates the same information plus additional infor-
mation, then, provided statistical reliability concerns are satisfied, perhaps only the
more specific one should be admitted. The less specific base rate arguably would be
excludable under FED. R. EvID. 403, on the ground that its limited probative value is
outweighed by the danger of confusion.
46 The odds form of Bayes' theorem indicates that prior probabilities have no influ-
ence on posterior probabilities only when the prior odds ratio, P(H)/P(-H) = 1. See
supra note 27. In cases such as the cab problem, where there are two mutually exclusive
and exhaustive hypotheses, this ratio is 1 only when the prior probability of each hy-
pothesis is 50 percent.
47 An example of information suggesting otherwise would be an inference of strate-
gic behavior by the party that introduced the citywide base rate, if it seems plausible that
the party could have computed a more specific base rate without undue difficulty.
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sample accurately represents the reference class as a whole. By con-
trast, when sufficiently large random samples are used, second-or-
der uncertainty is reduced and one may be confident that sample
and true reference class population base rates are similar.
However, the mere presence of second-order uncertainty does
not inform one about the direction in which a sample base rate
should be adjusted. Such adjustments should be made only when
other information (including prior probability estimates) is
available.
Accordingly, while large samples (like more specific reference
classes) are generally preferable because they incorporate more in-
formation, verdict accuracy concerns do not support treating them
differently from small samples in the absence of grounds for modify-
ing computed frequencies. 48 However, given additional informa-
tion, the conclusions derived from small samples should be more
readily revised than those derived from large samples.
In practice, however, the use of evidence based on small sam-
ples may often pose serious problems, especially in the absence of
reasonable cause for not using evidence based on larger samples.
When a litigant introduces a base rate derived from a small sample
without good cause, the inference of strategic behavior may be so
strong as to overwhelm the evidentiary value of the base rate.
3. Comparison of Base Rate Evidence to Case-Specific Evidence
Despite the widely conceded relevance of base rate evidence,
such evidence is commonly regarded as inferior to other kinds of
evidence. Base rate evidence is not always disparaged by reason of
its use of numbers, which after all "convey information in a different
form, but not of a different kind." 49 Instead, it is often disparaged
by reason of its derivation from background data, comprised of the
aggregate characteristics of a reference class. Background evidence
is considered somehow inferior to evidence that is individuating and
specific to the case at hand.
The intuitive basis for the distinction between background and
case-specific evidence is described by Professors Brilmayer and Nes-
son (neither of whom argues that the distinction is entirely correct
on its face). With regard to the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheti-
48 Professor Neil Cohen apparently would treat small samples differently from large
ones, since he argues that confidence intervals, which capture second-order uncertainty,
should be incorporated into the burden of proof. See N. Cohen I, supra note 34, at 404-
09; and Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to Pro-
fessor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 85 (1987). As Neil Cohen has come to recognize, his
views reflect a combination of verdict accuracy and other policy concerns which do not
necessarily minimize what he terms "fact errors."
49 Brook II, supra note 1, at 294.
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cals, Brilmayer notes that base rate evidence cannot tell us that the
ABC company "really" was at fault because it operated so many
blue buses, or that Sally Smith "really" was a gatecrasher. Instead,
she states, "[t]here is only a background statistic about the number
of buses owned, or the number of tickets sold." 50
As Brilmayer acknowledges, however, the same can be said
about case-specific evidence. 51 After all, both epistemologically and
in most cases practically, how can one ever "really" know anything?
For example, how can eyewitness testimony convince us that Sally
Smith "really" was a gatecrasher, rather than that she was probably
one? All evidence is probabilistic, requires inferences to support an
ultimate conclusion, and involves a risk of error if thought to estab-
lish that conclusion. 52 Base rate evidence is different only in that it
makes these uncertainties explicit.
Nesson further describes the underlying belief in the inferiority
of background statistical evidence through a hypothetical in which
one considers whether a card drawn from a well-shuffled deck was a
king. Absent case-specific evidence, statistical background evidence
suggests that the chances are 48/52 that it was not a king. Nesson
suggests that, if we rely on the background evidence but the card
turns out to be a king, we may conclude, not that we wrongly as-
sessed the probabilities, but that an improbable event occurred.53
Nesson contrasts this hypothetical to a second one in which,
while perhaps not knowing anything about the composition of the
deck of cards, we have case-specific evidence in the form of a quick
glance at the card which suggests that it is not a king. Here, if we
rely upon our eyesight but the card turns out to be a king, we may
conclude that we were wrong.54
As Nesson appears to recognize, the distinction is only seman-
tic. 55 In the second hypothetical, we presumably realize (or should
realize) that we usually, but not always, see an object correctly when
we are permitted a quick glance. We rely on the quick glance, ab-
sent better information, because it is correct most of the time.
Thus, the second hypothetical, like the first one, merely involves an
improbable event, rather than a decisional error.
50 Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 675.
51 Id. at 676.
52 Brilmayer nonetheless claims that the legal system is correct in treating back-
ground evidence as inferior to case-specific evidence, but she describes her position as a
"second-order principle," presumably reflecting policy considerations. See id
53 Nesson II, supra note 1, at 1361-62.
54 Id.
55 Nesson I, supra note 1. On the purely semantic nature of the distinction between
background and case-specific evidence, see Saks & Kidd, supra note 1, at 151-54; Richard
Schmalbeck, The Trouble With Statistical Evidence, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 232-33
(1986).
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Nesson views the semantic distinction between background sta-
tistical evidence and case-specific evidence as relevant because he
believes that people consider it so. He argues that, if people feel the
need for an evidentiary "bridge" from the general to the specific,
they will respond differently to verdicts based on the two types of
evidence. 56 Thus, he objects to base rate evidence based on policy
concerns, while recognizing that his views involve a sacrifice of ver-
dict accuracy. 57
From the standpoint of verdict accuracy, the equivalence be-
tween background and case-specific evidence is difficult to dis-
pute.58 Even cases involving "naked statistical evidence" (i.e., a base
rate unaccompanied by other evidence) should not be treated differ-
ently from other cases if one's sole concern is verdict accuracy. 59
For example, an eighty percent probability of guilt based entirely on
statistical background information involves the same twenty percent
chance of erroneous conviction as an eighty percent probability
based on the testimony of several witnesses. 60
4. Effects of Base Rates on Jury Consideration of Other Types of
Evidence
The previous Section argued that base rate evidence is just as
logically probative as case-specific evidence. However, even if the
two are equivalent in principle, one can argue that they have differ-
ent verdict accuracy effects in practice when used by actual, and falli-
ble, fact-finders.
Along these lines, Professor Tribe has argued that jurors will
systematically assign too much weight to base rate evidence. His
claim is that hard statistical data leads decisionmakers to "dwarf the
soft variables" and to assume that "[i]f you can't count it, it doesn't
exist." 6 1
56 See Nesson I, supra note 1, at 1196; Nesson II, supra note 1.
57 See Nesson II, supra note 1, at 1391-92.
58 Even L.J. Cohen, one of the harshest critics of the use of probabilistic methods in
legal reasoning, agrees that "relevant" base rate evidence is as probative as case-specific
evidence, since he advocates basing at least some verdicts on frequencies computed for
"suitably narrowed-down" reference classes. See LJ. Cohen II, supra note 1, at 633.
59 Again, a case may involve more than naked statistical evidence if the absence of
other evidence gives rise to an inference of strategic behavior by one or both parties.
We discuss the problem of strategic behavior further in Section IV. See infra notes 96-
103 and accompanying text.
60 The distinction between background and case-specific evidence may be illusory
altogether. Background data may be probative with respect to either prior probabilities
or likelihood ratios, even though the latter are ordinarily thought to reflect case-specific
evidence. See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof,
66 B.U.L. REV. 439, 454 n.44 (1986) (a mathematical analysis of the gatecrasher
paradox).
61 Tribe, supra note 1, at 1361. Oddly, while Tribe expects jurors to attach too
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If Tribe's behavioral assumption is correct, then juries might
tend to equate particular base rates with the probability of guilt or
liability even when other evidence suggests that it would be incor-
rect to do so. This could substantially weaken the grounds for ex-
pecting the admission of base rate evidence to improve verdict
accuracy.
However, recent psychological research does not support
Tribe's assumption. It suggests that, in a wide range of situations,
people generally undervalue base rate evidence and attach too much
weight to case-specific evidence. 62
One explanation for this phenomenon is that people pay more
attention to case-specific evidence because it is more anecdotal, per-
sonal, and vivid than a set of summary statistics.63 Others argue that
the use of a "representativeness heuristic" explains the effect.64 Re-
gardless of the sufficiency of these explanations, it appears clear that
base rate evidence, rather than case-specific evidence, tends to be
"dwarfed" or ignored in cases where both are present.65
B. The Use of Probability Theory to Combine Separate Items
of Base Rate Evidence
The previous Section argued that base rate evidence is no less
much weight to base rate evidence, he expects the public to attach too little weight to it,
and thus to distrust verdicts that overtly reflect its use. Id. at 1376. As James Brook
notes, he fails to explain this apparent contradiction. See Brook I, supra note 1, at 103.
62 This tendency to undervalue base rate information has been demonstrated not
only in numerous experimental investigations with naive subjects, see supra note 29, but
also with regard to practicing scientists and physicians. See, e.g., John I. Balla, Robert
Iansek & Arthur Elstein, Bayesian Diagnosis in Presence of Pre-existing Disease, LANCET, Feb. 9,
1985, at 326; David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Op-
portunities, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds. 1982); Paul E. Meehl & Albert Rosen, Ante-
cedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores, 52 PsYcHo-
LOGICAL BULL. 194 (1955).
63 RICHARD E. NISBErr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT (1980); Richard E. Nisbett & Eugene Borgida, Attribution
and the Psychology of Prediction, 32J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 932 (1975); Richard
E. Nisbett, Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall & Harvey Reed, Popular Induction: Information
is Not Necessarily Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113 (John S. Carroll &
John W. Payne eds. 1976). But see Shelley E. Taylor & Suzanne C. Thompson, Stalking
the Elusive "Vividness" Effect, 89 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 155 (1982) (arguing that the explan-
atory value of vividness in other contexts has been overstated).
64 A representativeness explanation might hold that individuating, case-specific in-
formation is regarded as more similar to, or representative of, the critical features of the
issue under consideration than base rate information. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra
note 28; Saks & Kidd, supra note 1, at 132.
65 For recent verifications of this problem in simulated trial conditions, see JANE
GOODMAN, PROBABILISTIC SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: JURORS' INFERENCES (1986); David L.
Faigman & AJ. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3
(1988); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 167-83 (1987).
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relevant than case-specific evidence, and that both are important
from the perspective of verdict accuracy. A question still arises,
however, as to how base rate evidence should be combined with
other evidence in computing a probability for guilt or liability. The
overtly probabilistic form of base rate evidence seems to invite the
use of mathematical devices such as Bayes' theorem and the product
rule when all requisite probabilities are available. However, some
have argued that the use of such devices is inappropriate even when
it is feasible-for verdict accuracy as well as policy reasons. 66
Commentators such as Brilmayer, Kornhauser, and LJ. Cohen
argue that probabilistic logic is too fundamentally flawed to improve
verdict accuracy even when applied to base rates. Instead, they
favor what they term "intuitive" decisionmaking strategies that re-
flect how statistically untrained people actually make decisions.
They argue that "intuition" is internally coherent and preferable to
probabilistic logic in the event of conflict.
In part, these commentators make a baseline argument: that
intuition should generally be presumed correct, unless and until it is
proven inadequate, and that probability theory is a departure that
requires strong justification. Thus, for example, they denounce the
Tversky and Kahneman study of people's responses to the cab ex-
ample for "arrogantly" assuming that Bayes' theorem provides the
correct answer.67 The following Section discusses the content of the
intuitive approach that some anti-Bayesians regard as the appropri-
ate baseline.
1. "Intuition" as an Alternative to Probabilistic Logic
One cannot endorse intuition as a baseline approach without
raising the question of what it actually is. In general, the meaning
that Brilmayer, Kornhauser, and LJ. Cohen assign to intuition ap-
pears to have at least three components: 1) value choices, 2) hasty
thinking or heuristic strategies, and 3) empirical beliefs.
a. Intuitive Value Choices
Consider again the gatecrasher paradox, relied upon by L.J.
Cohen to establish the incorrectness of probability theory. LJ. Co-
hen regards the case as paradoxical because, despite the apparent
50.1 percent probability that a randomly selected defendant is lia-
ble, "our intuitions ofjustice revolt against the idea that the plaintiff
66 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1.
67 Id. at 147. More specifically, they denounce Finkelstein for accepting the results
of the study. See also L. Jonathan Cohen, Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demon-
strated?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAiN Sci. 317, 328-29 (1981).
[Vol. 75:247266
VERIDICAL VERDICTS
should be awarded judgment on such grounds." 68 He therefore
concludes that a "mathematicist" interpretation of probability is
fundamentally flawed. 69
"Intuition" in this sense is merely a way of describing a value
choice. Given the probabilities (and assuming no ground for chang-
ing them), LJ. Cohen's intuition of justice plainly reflects policy
concerns apart from verdict accuracy. He prefers the 50.1 percent
chance of a mistake in holding for the defendant to the 49.9 percent
chance of a mistake in holding for the plaintiff-based, apparently,
on cost of error considerations. 70
Yet this value choice does not show probabilistic logic to be
flawed or "paradoxical" in relation to verdict accuracy.71 Even if
one's intuition about justice always provides the right answer to a
question, it can be correct only about the sum of the moral consider-
ations that one considers relevant. For example, an intuition about
the gatecrasher problem is correct, if at all, about the proper out-
come in light of all relevant concerns (both verdict accuracy and
separate policy). Yet one's bottom line moral intuition cannot al-
ways be correct about each particular value (such as verdict accuracy
alone) unless one's values always are consistent with each other.72
b. Intuitive Hasty Thinking and Heuristic Strategies
In some cases, "intuitive" thinking may actually involve nothing
more than careless, hasty, ill-informed reasoning. Consider again
the cab hypothetical, in which Tversky and Kahneman assume that
Bayes' theorem, rather than the responses of their test subjects, pro-
vides the correct answer.
The Cohen-Brilmayer-Kornhauser attack on Tversky and
Kahneman for preferring "logic" to "intuition" begs the question of
whether Bayes' theorem truly is counter-intuitive-or instead is just
not immediately obvious. After all, the theorem can be made intui-
tively plausible through examples, and can be proven logically (i.e.,
in an intuitively plausible way) by reasoning from intuitively plausi-
ble premises. The same is true of the product rule (which indeed
68 LJ. Cohen II, supra note 1, at 627. Not everyone's intuition is similarly revolted
by the prospect of a judgment for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brook I, supra note 1, at 86;
Schmalbeck, supra note 55, at 222.
69 LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1, at 74-81.
70 See id. at 75-80; L.J. Cohen II, supra note 1, at 632.
71 See Brook II supra note 1, at 322.
72 LJ. Cohen rejects the possibility of conflict among the values that are served by
trials based on little more than wishful thinking. Thus, he states that holding for the
plaintiff when there is a measurable chance of error "hardly seems the right spirit in
which to administer justice." LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1, at 75. He fails to appreciate
that plaintiffs are wronged by incorrect verdicts for defendants and that incorrect ver-
dicts are an inevitable byproduct of uncertainty. See Brook II, supra note 1, at 318-19.
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may be intuitively obvious to begin with). Thus, the failure to apply
either rule may reflect, not a conscious or coherent choice, but in-
stead only a lack of careful thinking-or, more sympathetically, a
heuristic strategy of simplifying information for purposes of making
rapid decisions. 73
Studies of heuristic strategies reveal that, while these strategies
save time and effort, they sometimes lead to predictably inaccurate
results. Consider, for example, the observation that people often
assess the probability or frequency of an event by the ease with
which relevant instances can be brought to mind. 74 Although this
strategy has intuitive appeal, the relation between frequency and re-
call is imperfect. Research shows that vivid or salient events are
more likely to be recalled than less salient events, even when the
latter are more frequent. Consequently, this strategy may result in
an overestimation of the probabilities associated with vivid or salient
events and an underestimation of the probabilities associated with
less vivid or salient events.
There is no reason to resent logic for demonstrating the weak-
ness of certain approaches that initially are appealing as intuitive
shortcuts. As Saks and Kidd have noted, humanity is hardly de-
graded by its ability to recognize cognitive limitations and to invent
tools that permit an increase in the rigor and power of human
thought processes. 75
c. Intuitive Empirical Beliefs
A final type of intuition relied upon by L.J. Cohen, Brilmayer,
and Kornhauser involves empirical claims that we cannot verify but
consider highly plausible. If probabilistic logic suggests results that
are inconsistent with intuitive empirical beliefs, then one or the
other must be wrong-arguably logic, if one has sufficient confi-
dence in one's intuitive predictions.
The claim of inconsistency with well-founded intuitive empirical
beliefs commonly is expressed in the form of paradoxes that are said
to follow from probabilistic logic. A number of these paradoxes al-
ready have been refuted or shown to be irrelevant to the choice be-
tween "logic" and "intuition." 76 However, we will discuss two
73 While some people might refuse to accept probabilistic logic even if it were ex-
plained to them, this refusal might be inconsistent with other beliefs that they hold, and
they might ultimately agree that their beliefs should be internally consistent.
74 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
75 See Saks & Kidd, supra note 1, at 148.
76 See, e.g., Stephen E. Fienberg, Gatecrashers, Blue Buses, and the Bayesian Representation
of Legal Evidence, 66 B.U.L. REv. 693 (1986); D.H. Kaye, Comment: A First Look at "Second-
Order Evidence", 66 B.U.L. REv. 701 (1986) [hereinafter First Look]; David Kaye, The Para-
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apparent paradoxes, one purportedly impeaching the product rule
and the other, Bayes' theorem, that have not as fully been addressed
in the legal literature.
(1) The Multiple Issue Fallacy-L.J. Cohen argues that the prod-
uct rule paradoxically requires accepting the apparently implausible
view that plaintiffs almost never are entitled to recover in civil cases
that are complex or that involve multiple legal issuesP 7 To illus-
trate his argument, consider a plaintiff who needs to prove ten sepa-
rate facts in order to be entitled to damages. Assume that there is a
ninety percent probability that the plaintiff is correct about each
fact. If the facts are independent, then, under the product rule, the
posterior probability that the plaintiff should prevail would be (.910),
or approximately thirty-five percent. Yet intuitively one might esti-
mate that plaintiffs who are so strongly supported by the facts are
more than thirty-five percent likely to be correct.
LJ. Cohen recognizes that the "paradox" does not exist if one
can explain the assumed higher percentage by positing that the is-
sues in a multi-faceted cause of action are rarely independent. 78 For
example, if in the above hypothetical the plaintiff's ten contentions
were entirely dependent, the posterior probability that the plaintiff
should prevail would be ninety percent. Cohen's only argument
against this solution is that a plaintiff's contentions may be nega-
tively dependent instead of positively dependent (i.e., the truth of
each contention may decrease the likelihood of each other conten-
tion being true).
While negative dependence no doubt occurs, it is unclear why
one should expect it to be more common than positive dependence.
Indeed, intuitively one may expect positive dependence to be more
common. For example, witnesses who testify for the same party on
several issues may have consistent degrees of reliability. Or, the
conclusion that a plaintiff believed a contract was formed may in-
crease the likelihood both of contract formation and of plaintiff
performance. 79
dox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101; Anne W. Martin, Comment,
66 B.U.L. RE,. 709 (1986). Some of the asserted paradoxes rest on the claim that prob-
abilistic logic is self-contradictory, rather than inconsistent with intuitive predictions. See
Kaye, First Look, supra, at 705-06.
77 LJ. COHEN I, supra note 1, at 58-67.
78 See id. at 61.
79 L.J. Cohen supports his argument that negative dependence may be as common
as positive dependence with a hypothetical example, involving a plaintiff who claims (1)
that a contract was formed, (2) that the plaintiff performed under the contract, and (3)
that the defendant did not perform. Cohen argues that evidence supporting contract
formation would tend to rebut the claim that the defendant did not perform. Yet there
is nothing implausible about inferring plaintiff performance, but not defendant perform-
ance, from the fact of contract formation. For example, one could argue that the de-
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Thus, the apparent inconsistency between the product rule and
intuitive prediction arises only if one makes unrealistic (and indeed,
counter-intuitive) assumptions about the typical dependence rela-
tionships among a plaintiff's factual claims. One cannot show that
the product rule is inconsistent with well-founded intuitive
predictions.
(2) Bayes' Theorem and the Todhunter Paradox-As demonstrated
by the cab example, Bayes' theorem can be somewhat counter-intui-
tive. Strong case-specific evidence in the form of a high likelihood
ratio can give rise to a low posterior probability when combined
with a low prior odds ratio. Some advocates of intuitive methods
contend that Bayesian combination techniques may, at times, yield
posterior probabilities that are not only counter-intuitive, but im-
plausible as well. The so-called Todhunter paradox has been cited
by several commentators in support of this view.80
The paradox may be described as follows: Suppose that a wit-
ness who is correct 99.9 percent of the time claims that the winning
number in a lottery of 10,000 tickets was 297. Intuitively, it would
seem that we can be 99.9 percent certain that 297 really was the
winning number. The number of tickets in the lottery appears to be
irrelevant.
However, the Bayesian method requires taking into account the
prior probability that 297 would win. This probability clearly does
depend on the number of tickets in the lottery, and in this instance
is 1 in 10,000. According to LJ. Cohen and others, when this re-
mote prior probability is incorporated into the Bayesian computa-
tion, the posterior probability that 297 is the winning number, given
that the witness said it was, is very small.81 Not only is this result
counter-intuitive, but experience with announced winning lottery
numbers clearly contradicts it as well.
fendant intended to accept payment but not to perform, or that performance became
disadvantageous to the defendant after the contract was formed due to a change in cir-
cumstances. Id. at 61-62.
80 LJ. Cohen, supra note 67, at 329; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note I, at 148
n. 114; Llkka Niiniluoto, L.J. Cohen Versus Bayesianism, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 349, 349
(1981).
81 According to Bayes' theorem, the posterior probability that the winning ticket is
297 given that the witness says so is computed as follows:
P("297"/297) P(297)P(297/"297"') =
P("297"/297) P(297) + P("297"/not 297) P(not 297)
where 297 = the winning ticket is in fact number 297
"297" = the witness says the winning ticket is number 297.
Under Cohen's proposed Bayesian calculation, the posterior probability indicates
only a 9 percent chance that the winning ticket was 297 even though the highly reliable
witness says so:
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However, the above computation contains a crucial mistake in
its application of Bayes' theorem. It confuses (1) the probability
that the witness made some mistake (i.e., .1 percent, or 1/1,000)
with (2) the probability that he made this particular mistake. Yet this
second, smaller probability is the one that is of interest here.
What is the probability of this particular mistake, i.e., the
probability that the witness says "297" when the winning ticket is in
fact some number other than 297? If all possible mistakes were
equally likely, then the probability that the witness would say "297"
given that he had made a mistake is 1/9,999 (since there are 9,999
possible mistakes in a 10,000 ticket lottery).8 2 Therefore, the
probability of the witness's particular mistake may be described as
P("297"/not 297) = P (mistake) X P("297"/mistake) = 1/1000 X
1/9999.
The correct Bayesian computation for the Todhunter problem
suggests a posterior probability of 99.9 percent that the winning
ticket was 297.83 This is well in accord with the intuition and experi-
ence that is relied upon to establish the paradox. Thus, the
Todhunter problem provides no support for the claim that intuitive
predictions are superior to probability theory when the two are
inconsistent.8 4
2. Empirical Grounds for Choosing Between Probabilistic Logic and
Intuition
At present, there is no direct empirical evidence showing
whether probabilistic logic or intuition, as applied in the legal set-
ting, leads to greater verdict accuracy. Brilmayer and Kornhauser
contend that empirical demonstration in this area is impossible, due
to the lack of a truth criterion for trials.85 That is, since it is rarely, if
ever, possible to determine the accuracy of particular verdicts, one
(.999) (.0001)
P(297/"297") = -- .09.(.999) (.0001) + (.001) (.9999)
82 In practice, some mistakes may be more likely than others (e.g., an error that
contains only a single wrong digit may be more likely than an error in which all three
digits are wrong). However, 1/9,999 can be taken as an average because we do not
know what the correct ticket is.
83 The correct Bayesian solution to the Todhunter problem is as follows:
(.999) (.0001)
P(297/"297") = = .999.(.999) (.0001) + (.001) (1/9999) (.9999)
For a similar analysis, see Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96
YALE LJ. 667, 738 (1987).
84 Discussions with Joshua Klayman about this problem were especially valuable.
85 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 138, 145.
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cannot prove that the use of probabilistic logic increases verdict
accuracy.
Because of the truth criterion problem, empirical verification of
the superiority of probabilistic reasoning over intuitive reasoning in
the legal setting is indeed difficult to obtain. However, substantial
evidence from other fields where truth criteria exist suggests the su-
periority of probabilistic methods.8 6 Even in decisionmaking areas
where only subjective estimates of the relevant probabilities are
used, there is some evidence that judgmental accuracy is increased
by using Bayes' theorem instead of intuitive methods.8 7
Even though the evidence that Bayesian methods improve judg-
mental accuracy is taken from areas outside the legal setting, it
strengthens the inference that Bayesian methods are superior to in-
tuitive ones and would improve verdict accuracy. At a minimum,
the evidence supports shifting the burden of proof to anti-Bayesians
to explain why intuitive methods will work better in the law when
they yield worse results in all other tested fields.
III
VERDICT ACCURACY AND THE USER OF SUBJECTIVE
PROBABILITIES
In most trials, evidence other than base rates is introduced for
consideration by fact-finders. When such evidence is available, or
when fact-finders apply their own knowledge and experience to a
case, subjective probability issues arise. How credible is an eyewit-
ness identification placing the defendant at the scene of a crime?
How likely is it that the defendant made the threats that a witness
claims to have heard? How clearly does photographic evidence de-
pict an exchange of money? Even when fact-finders do not make
explicit or precise probability estimates about issues, their decisions
may be influenced by implicit estimates.
86 See, e.g., PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETI-
CAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954); Robyn M. Dawes, The Robust Beauty of
Improper Linear Models in Decision Making, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 571 (1979) (graduate
admissions); Bruce Duthie & Ken R. Vincent, Diagnostic Hit Rates of High Point Codes for the
Diagnostic Inventory of Personality and Symptoms Using Random Assignment, Base Rates, and
Probability Scales, 42 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 612 (1986); HillelJ. Einhorn, Expert Mea-
surement and Mechanical Combination, 7 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 86
(1972) (patient longevity); Robert Libby, Man versus Model of Man: Some Conflicting Evi-
dence, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1 (1976) (business failures);
Jack Sawyer, Measurement And Prediction: Clinical And Statistical, 66 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
178 (1966) (clinical).
87 See Balla, Iansek, & Elstein, supra note 62. Admittedly, evidence directly bearing
on this claim is scant, although to the extent subjective estimates of the relevant
probabilities are in accord with more "objective" estimates, Bayesian methods likely will
increase decisional accuracy.
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A question arises as to whether rules of probability theory
should be applied to combine subjective probability estimates with
other information in computing posterior probabilities. Anti-Bayes-
ian commentators have argued that the specification and explicit use
of subjective probabilities are inappropriate even when feasible.88
Although some base their arguments entirely on policy concerns
other than verdict accuracy,89 others do not.90 This section assesses
the use of subjective probabilities in relation to verdict accuracy.
A. The Underlying Debate Concerning the Use of Subjective
Probabilities in Statistics
Statisticians have long disagreed about how subjective
probabilities, particularly subjective prior probabilities, should
enter into decision analyses.9 1 To Bayesian statisticians, such
probabilities capture informational components of problems, and
should therefore be incorporated into formal analyses. Classical
statisticians, on the other hand, prefer to restrict their formal analy-
ses to hard data, and to incorporate subjective probability judg-
ments informally prior to making decisions. 92
The underlying debate between Bayesian and classical statisti-
cians is partly aesthetic and partly practical. The aesthetic issue con-
cers whether it is appropriate to extend an appearance of
mathematical rigor to the analysis of data as vague and personal as
subjective probabilities. The practical issue concerns whether for-
mal use of subjective probabilities actually increases judgmental
accuracy.
There is no generally correct answer even to the practical is-
sue.93 The effect of mathematical logic on judgmental accuracy de-
pends on how well the available information correlates with reality.
A subjective probability estimate that is relatively well-founded (e.g.,
based on reliable and extensive observation) may be relatively likely
to improve judgmental accuracy. As an estimate becomes less well-
founded, its capacity to improve decisional accuracy may decline.
However, neither classical nor Bayesian statisticians view intui-
88 The specification and use of subjective probabilities raise practical problems in-
volving computational complexity, and translation difficulty (i.e., meaningfully con-
verting one's judgments about evidence into numerical terms). We address these
problems in Section IV, infra.
89 See, e.g., Nesson II, supra note 1.
90 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1.
91 See, e.g., Allan Birnbaum, On the Foundations of Statistical Inference, 57J. Am. STATIs-
TICAL A. 269 (1962); Bross, Discussion of A. Birnbaum's Paper, "On the Foundations of Statisti-
cal Inference," id. at 309.
92 See, e.g., Harry V. Roberts, "Bayesian Inference, " in 2 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. Sci.
28 (1968).
93 But see supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
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tive combination methods as superior to probability theory. Classi-
cal statisticians argue only that there is little to be gained from using
probability theory with respect to subjective probabilities, not that
intuition works better.
B. Advantages of Using Probability Theory at Trial with
Regard to Subjective Probabilities
Inaccurate information is likely to yield inaccurate verdicts re-
gardless of the aggregation technique employed. In such cases, it is
difficult to argue that one method is superior to another in produc-
ing accurate outcomes. However, good reasons remain-even apart
from the empirical evidence discussed above-for expecting that
mathematically rigorous techniques will, in general, yield more ac-
curate verdicts than other methods such as unaided intuition.
This expectation arises from two advantages of using mathe-
matical logic. First, it enables one to be internally consistent and
logical in deriving conclusions from one's information and beliefs.
Second, it ameliorates difficulties in combining "hard" with "soft"
evidence.
1. Internal Consistency
Applications of probability theory such as the product rule and
Bayes' theorem are derived from a handful of simple axioms. By
providing coherent means for combining separate items of informa-
tion, they permit decisionmakers to reach conclusions that are con-
sistent with their judgments about all of the available information.
In contrast, intuitive methods provide no guidelines for com-
bining judgments about separate items of information. Lacking
guiding axioms, they permit a decisionmaker to reach virtually any
conclusion on the basis of any set of evidence.
To be sure, greater internal consistency does not guarantee
greater verdict accuracy. An increase in the internal consistency of
jury verdicts conceivably could lead to reduced verdict accuracy, if,
for example, jurors' beliefs about subsidiary issues of fact are com-
monly wrong. However, if there is a positive correlation between
jury judgments about such issues and actual states of affairs, verdict
accuracy is likely to be enhanced by procedures that ensure internal
coherence. 94
94 The view that there is no positive correlation between jury judgments about sub-
sidiary issues of fact and actual states of affairs would appear to have implications going
far beyond the choice between probability theory and intuition. Absent a positive corre-
lation, verdict accuracy might be so low as to suggest that the trial system is not meeting
minimum standards of acceptable dispute resolution.
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2. Combining "Hard" With "Soft" Evidence
In addition to improving internal consistency, the use of mathe-
matical logic with respect to subjective probabilities may ameliorate
the difficulties that fact-finders experience in combining "hard" with
"soft" evidence. Whether one agrees with Tribe's intuition about
the tendency of fact-finders to "dwarf the soft variables," or with the
empirical research suggesting that it is the hard data that get
slighted, the use of mathematical logic can assure that neither type
of evidence dwarfs the other.95 No such assurance is provided by
alternative combination methods.
IV
PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF OVERTLY PROBABILISTIC
EVIDENCE AND METHODS
Although the use of overtly probabilistic evidence and method-
ologies generally can improve verdict accuracy, in some situations
their benefit is more questionable. This section describes some of
the problems associated with probabilistic evidence and procedures
that restrict their usefulness in the courtroom.
A. Complexity and Translation Difficulties
Previous commentators have noted the unmanageable com-
plexity that can result from attempting to apply rules of mathemati-
cal logic to multiple factual issues, beliefs about the issues, and
underlying items of evidence.96 Where such complexity is great
enough, the likelihood of error or misapplication of the rules may
be large enough to offset any verdict accuracy benefit (even disre-
garding separate policy concerns such as attempting to minimize the
length and cost of trials).
Computational complexity is only one aspect of what may often
be the prohibitive difficulty of applying rules of mathematical logic
in the courtroom. A more fundamental problem is that fact-finders
are likely to experience difficulty in translating all relevant evidence
into numerical terms. Since few people are accustomed to statistical
ways of thinking and reasoning, there is a danger that one's opin-
ions and judgments may be altered when they are restated
numerically.
A related problem is that some of the probabilities needed to
95 It is somewhat ironic that those who oppose the use of formal combination tech-
niques such as Bayes' theorem frequently lament the difficulties that juries have combin-
ing the various types of hard and soft data that are presented at trial.
96 See, e.g., Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. LJ. 1 (1982); Tribe, supra note 1.
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perform particular mathematical operations may be unavailable or
difficult to specify. For example, several probabilities are required
to compute posterior probabilities under Bayes' theorem,97 and,
further, even if base rate evidence is available for both it may be
unclear which base rates should be used.98 Furthermore, the condi-
tional probabilities that compose the Bayesian likelihood ratio may
be difficult to conceptualize, let alone quantify.
For example, in assessing the likelihood that a defendant com-
mitted a crime given a set of evidence, a Bayesian fact-finder must
be able to specify both the prior probability that the defendant com-
mitted the crime and the likelihood that the set of evidence would
be present both if he did and if he did not commit the crime. Not
only are such probabilities hard to think about and specify, but there
is evidence that people fail to understand their relevance for poste-
rior probability computations even when their values are supplied. 99
Further difficulties arise in attempting to specify the degree of
dependence between two events in order to apply the product rule.
For example, in a contract case where the only contested issues are
contract formation and plaintiff performance, even jurors who can
specify a subjective probability for each issue may have difficulty
specifying how plaintiff correctness on the former issue affects the
likelihood of plaintiff correctness on the latter.
Translation difficulties suggest that mathematical tools will not
assist fact-finders in all (or perhaps even many) cases. These diffi-
culties often may be severe enough to offset any expected benefit to
verdict accuracy from applying logical techniques.
However, this does not weaken the expectation of benefit in
cases where the difficulties are relatively slight. Consider cases
where there are only a few items of evidence, one of which is overtly
probabilistic and relates, for example, to paternity or to the identifi-
cation of blood, hair, and skin samples found at the scene of an inci-
dent. 00 In addition, consider cases where one could reasonably
argue that the elements of the plaintiff's case are independent. In-
struction about the product rule may prevent juries from holding
97 In order to compute P(H/D), one needs to know P(H), P(not H), P(D/H), and
P(D/not H). See supra note 84. However, since P(H) + P(-H) = 1, one need only know
one prior probability to compute the other. Furthermore, if one is presented with a
single value for the likelihood ratio, one need not be concerned with the values of the
individual conditional probabilities P(D/H) and P(D/-H) that compose it.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 30-87.
99 See Ruth Beyth-Marom & Baruch Fischhoff, Diagnosticity and Pseudodiagnosticity, 45
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1185 (1983); Michal E. Doherty, Clifford R. Mynatt,
Ryan D. Tweney & Miael D. Schiavo, Pseudodiagnosticity, 43 AcTA PSYCHOLOGICA 111
(1979).
100 Such evidence may provide, for example, the percentage of the population that,
like the defendant, would be a possible source of the tested genetic material.
276 [Vol. 75:247
VERIDICAL VERDICTS
for a plaintiff who is likely to be correct about each element of his or
her claims, but who is not likely to be correct overall. 10 1
Yet, even in the great majority of cases where juries cannot be
expected to make rigorous mathematical computations, instruction
about probability theory (either by an expert or from the bench)
may be helpful. Such instruction may permit juries to understand
the significance of base rate evidence, and more generally to com-
bine "hard" and "soft" evidence without unduly favoring either.
Thus, such instruction may improve verdict accuracy even if used
relatively loosely as a guide to intuitive judgments.
Judges also may benefit from understanding probability theory.
For example, such understanding might improve decisions about
the admissibility of base rate evidence where the only consideration
is balancing its probative value against undue prejudice or delay.
Further, when a knowledgeable judge rather than a jury is the fact-
finder, more extensive and formal reliance on probability theory
may be feasible.
B. Feedback Problems with the Use of Base Rates
In Section II, we argued that verdict accuracy generally can be
improved by incorporating base rate evidence into the trial process.
However, the use of such evidence can give rise to feedback, or op-
portunistic responses to the knowledge that such evidence is being
used. As an example, consider permitting prosecutors to introduce
base rate evidence showing the percentage of defendants, in trials
concerning similar crimes, who were actually guilty (assuming that
this could somehow be determined). Admitting this evidence in or-
der to suggest a prior probability of guilt, however inconsistent with
the constitutionally based presumption of innocence, might increase
verdict accuracy.
However, it may be that one reason for the frequency of actual
guilt among such defendants is that prosecutors, in light of the pre-
sumption of innocence, do not indict unless the evidence of guilt is
relatively strong. If prosecutors subsequently began indicting based
on weaker evidence, then the base rate frequency might change. In
other words, the very fact that the base rate evidence was being used
could cause this frequency to change and diminish its probative
value.10 2
101 Jury instructions seem to require juries to look at each element separately, not at
the aggregate of the plaintiff's case. Nesson II, supra note 1, at 1386-88, defends such
instructions on policy grounds.
102 Admittedly, the base rate frequency could be continually updated to ensure that
jurors receive accurate information. Yet, there might be accuracy concerns about the
updating.
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Feedback effects are difficult to factor into decision analyses be-
cause one often has no way of knowing their direction or magnitude.
Indeed, it is hard to predict when such effects are most likely to oc-
cur (with regard to both base rates and other kinds of evidence).
The possibility of such effects reminds us, however, that the admissi-
bility of base rate evidence is not a straightforward matter, from
either a verdict accuracy or a general policy perspective.' 0 3
V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article examined the capacity of overtly probabilistic evi-
dence and methodologies to improve verdict accuracy. Policy and
other practical reasons for avoiding an overtly probabilistic trial
process have been downplayed in order to explore the idea that
base rates and other probabilistic evidence are rich sources of infor-
mation that, at present, are not always understood in legal circles.
Base rate evidence, while neither a panacea nor devoid of
problems, is relevant to the truth of asserted facts, and indeed is no
less relevant in principle than case-specific evidence. An eighty per-
cent probability of guilt based entirely on base rate information car-
ries with it the same twenty percent chance of a false conviction as
an eighty percent probability of guilt based on, say, the somewhat
unreliable testimony of an eyewitness. All evidence contains a risk
of error if relied upon to support a conclusion; overtly probabilistic
evidence simply makes the risk more visible.
A wide range of base rates are potentially relevant to a question
of fact. Some base rates are more informative or reliable than
others because they are based on more appropriate reference
classes. However, from a verdict accuracy standpoint, a base rate
need not meet any minimum standard of specificity in order to have
evidentiary weight. There usually is no such thing as the correct
base rate for a particular issue. Even base rates that are relatively
unspecific, or that are based on relatively small samples, may pro-
vide the best estimate for a given frequency in the absence of other
information.
Overtly probabilistic methodologies that employ rules of
probability theory (such as the product rule or Bayes' theorem) also
can improve verdict accuracy. In combining multiple items of evi-
dence, intuitive strategies are often inconsistent with and inferior to
mathematical techniques. Even with regard to subjective probabili-
103 The strategic introduction or withholding of information is a concern with all
types of evidence presented at trial. Whether or not the consequences of such strategiz-
ing are most serious when statistical evidence is involved is an empirical question that, to
our knowledge, has not been tested.
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ties, probability theory is likely to improve verdict accuracy when
there is a positive correlation between jury probability estimates and
actual states of affairs.
To be sure, there are situations where overtly probabilistic
methodologies may bring little benefit. Sometimes fact-finders may
have difficulty using them correctly due to complexity and transla-
tion difficulties. The use of base rates may also cause feedback
problems.
However, there appears to be little evidence that base rate in-
formation will "dwarf the soft variables," leading jurors to pay too
little attention to case-specific evidence. Psychological research sug-
gests instead that base rate evidence is more likely to be un-
derweighted. Yet whether jurors pay too little attention to the
"hard" evidence or the "soft," the difficulties which they experience
in combining the two provide a strong reason for acquainting them
with mathematical rules that treat the two as equivalent.
In closing, we wish to reiterate that we do not claim that overtly
probabilistic evidence and methods should be incorporated into tri-
als. Nor do we claim that policy concerns other than verdict accu-
racy are unimportant. However, we do claim that the use of an
overtly probabilistic approach is neither logically nor theoretically
inappropriate.
Commentators who oppose such an approach even when it is
feasible are urging a sacrifice of verdict accuracy in order to advance
other policy objectives. There is nothing wrong in principle with
such a tradeoff, and it may be appropriate in many instances. But
this tradeoff requires explicit acknowledgement and justification
based on a thorough understanding of the benefits of overtly proba-
bilistic evidence and methods.
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